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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In the mid-1990s Mr. John Bushnell went through a difficult divorce. As a result 
of that difficult divorce, Mr. Bushnell fell behind on paying his taxes and filing his tax 
returns. In January 2005, after putting his life back together, Mr. Bushnell desired to 
become current with the IRS. He began by organizing his documents and contacting the 
IRS to prepare and file prior year tax returns from 1997 through 2003. (R.436 at 493). 
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Mr. Bushnell hired a bookkeeper, Denise Naylor, to organize his receipts, bank 
statements, copies of checks, and other financial documents. (Id; R. 437 at 611). At Mr. 
BushneH's request, the IRS sent him records relating to his tax returns for the years 1997 
through 2003. Once Mr. Bushnell had the information from the IRS, and his documents 
had been organized and placed into the software program Quicken, he needed a certified 
public accountant ("CPA") to prepare the returns and perhaps negotiate with the IRS. 
Mr. Bushnell turned to Dale K. Barker, P.C (hereinafter "Barker") to complete those final 
tasks. Mr. Dale K. Barker, Jr. of Dale K. Barker, P.C. met with Mr. Bushnell, and Ms. 
Naylor. After listening to what needed to be done, Mr. Barker stated that he was an 
expert at dealing with the IRS and estimated that it would cost approximately $15,000 to 
prepare and file the past tax returns and negotiate with the IRS. (R.436 at 498-99; R437 
at 614). Even though the estimate seemed high to prepare seven tax returns, Mr. 
Bushnell decided that he needed to hire someone who was as experienced as Mr. Barker 
represented himself to be. (R.436 at 499-500). Unfortunately, Mr. BushnelPs reliance 
upon the expertise of Barker would prove misplaced, as Barker would create much more 
work than was needed, would pick fights with the IRS agents, would miss deadlines 
agreed upon with the IRS Agents, and would charge Mr. Bushnell over $51,675.20l for 
1
 The total invoice amount billed to Mr. Bushnell was $19,000.00 and the total invoice 
amount billed to Bushnet was $45,355.20. However, the invoice amount billed to 
Bushnet included a charge for $12,680.20 for a payment of taxes made by Barker to the 
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the work he requested. After a year of unnecessary delays, fights with the IRS, and over-
billing, Mr. Bushnell found a new CPA and hired an attorney to dispute Barker's bill. 
After a few failed settlement attempts with Barker, Plaintiff/Appellant Dale K. Barker, 
P.C. initiated this action by filing a Complaint against Defendants/Appellees John 
Bushnell ("Bushnell") and Bushnet, P.C. ("Bushnett") for breach of contract. 
Defendant/Appellee John Bushnell brought a counter-claim against Barker for breach of 
contract and a third-party complaint against Mr. Barker personally for malpractice. After 
four days of trail before Judge Fratto, the Court found that Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet had 
not breached their contracts with Barker, and further found that it was Barker who had 
breached the contract with Mr. Bushnell. The Court awarded Mr. Bushnell nominal 
damages and his costs and attorney fees pursuant to the parties' contract. 
H. STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO THIS REVIEW 
The Trial Court found the following facts after the close of trial. (R. 460 -65) 
1. In the Spring of 2005, Mr. Bushnell had not filed tax returns from 1997 
through 2003, nor had he paid taxes for the years 1995 through 2003. 
2. Dale K. Barker, P.C. is an accounting firm located in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
IRS in behalf of John Bushnell personally. As explained below in footnote four, the 
billings to Mr. Bushnell and to Bushnet are treated as one by Mr. Bushnell due to the fact 
that the billings to Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet were comingled by Barker, as evidenced by 
inclusion on Bushnet's bill of the $12,680.20 payment made in behalf of Mr. Bushnell 
personally. (See infra note 4) 
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3. Dale K. Barker, Jr. ("Dale Barker") is a certified public accountant. 
4. In April 2005, Mr. Bushnell met with Dale Barker of Dale K. Barker, P.C. 
to discuss Mr. Bushnell's and Bushnet's tax returns for 1997 through 2003, and the 
money he owed to the IRS for the years 1995 through 2003. 
5. In that meeting, Mr. Barker told Mr. Bushnell that he was an expert at 
dealing with situations such as this and in negotiating with the IRS. 
6. Dale K. Barker, P.C. and John Bushnell entered into a Services Agreement 
on or about April 28, 2005, wherein "Barker agree[d] to perform... [a]ll requested 
services as set forth by Client and as understood by Barker either express, written, or/and 
implied." 
7. Barker and Bushnet, P.C. entered into a Services Agreement on, or about, 
September 15, 2005 wherein "Barker agree[d] to perform... [a]ll requested services as set 
forth by Client and as understood by Barker either express, written, or/and implied." 
8. The parties agreed that the task to be performed by Barker was to prepare 
the late tax returns for Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet and to negotiate the payment amounts 
with the IRS, if necessary. 
9. Other than the general agreement of the task to be performed by Barker 
under the Services Agreement, established by parole evidence at trial, the Services 
Agreement does not specifically indicate what work must be performed by Barker, nor 
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does it indicate the amount that must be paid for work performed. 
10. Because there is no definite understanding as to what work must be done, 
and taking into consideration that the contract was drafted by Barker and was not 
negotiated at arm's length, the trial court applied a reasonable and necessary standard to 
determine whether the work done by Barker was required under the contract. 
11. On April 28, 2005, or shortly thereafter, Mr. Bushnell provided to Mr. 
Barker a disk that had all of his financial information for the years 1997 through 2004 
organized in the program "Quicken." 
12. Notwithstanding the financial information organized in the "Quicken" 
program, Barker requested that Mr. Bushnell provide to him all of his financial 
information from the years 1997 through 2003. 
13. Shortly after the request was made by Barker, Mr. Bushnell provided to 
Barker numerous boxes containing all of Mr. Bushnell's and Bushnet's financial 
information for the years 1997 through 2003. 
14. Although Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet's information was organized in the 
"Quicken" program, Barker took it upon itself to prepare a compilation of the financial 
information. 
15. The trial court reviewed the compilations that were done by Barker, the 
records from which they were produced, and the information contained in the "Quicken" 
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program. After considering the evidence, the trial court found that the compilation was 
not reasonable and necessary in order to accomplish the tasks required by the contract. 
16. Shortly after the Services Agreement was signed by the parties, Mr. 
Bushnell signed a power of attorney ("POA") so that Mr. Barker could speak to the IRS 
in his behalf. 
17. After the POA was executed, Mr. Barker contacted the IRS and entered into 
an agreement that Mr. Bushnell would pay the amounts owing for the years 1995 and 
1996 immediately, and agreed to have Mr. Bushnell's returns from 1998 through 2003 
filed with the IRS by June 24, 2005. 
18. Barker did not file Mr. Bushnell's tax returns for the years 1998 through 
2003 by June 24, 2005, nor had Barker prepared Mr. Bushnell's tax returns for the years 
1998 through 2003 by June 24, 2005. 
19. On June 24, 2005, or shortly thereafter, Mr. Barker spoke with the IRS to 
request an extension to file Mr. Bushnell's tax returns for 1998 through 2003. Mr. Barker 
and the IRS agent agreed that the tax returns would be filed by August 19, 2005. 
20. Barker did not file Mr. Bushnell's tax returns for the years 1998 through 
2003 by August 19, 2005, nor had Barker prepared Mr. Bushnell's tax returns for the 
years 1998 through 2003 by August 19, 2005. 
21. Barker did not contact the IRS agent to inform her that the tax returns 
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would not be filed by August 19, 2005. 
22. On August 30, 2005 and September 1, 2005, Barker prepared Mr. 
BushnelPs tax returns for the years 1998 through 2003. 
23. Barker filed Mr. Bushnell's tax returns on September 16, 2005. 
24. The tax return prepared by Barker for the year 1999 contained a substantial 
error where it underreported income in the amount of approximately $45,000. 
25. The tax return prepared by Barker for the year 2004 contained an error 
where it classified Bushnet as a Subchapter S corporation, when in fact it had not made 
an election to be a Subchapter S. 
26. Barker never made the Subchapter S election for Bushnet, even though he 
could have made a late Subchapter S election for Bushnet. 
27. Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet had to hire another CPA to correct the problems 
made by Barker in preparing the 1999 tax return and the 2004 tax return, and to deal with 
the IRS regarding those problems. 
28. After the tax returns were filed, the IRS demanded payment for the 
amounts owing. 
29. Barker counseled Mr. Bushnell not to pay the amounts owing until they 
could request an abatement of fees. 
30. Due to the nonpayment of the amounts owing, the IRS filed federal tax 
10 
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liens against Mr. Bushnell's property for the tax years 1998, 2000, and 2003. 
31. Barker could have avoided the filing of federal tax liens against Mr. 
Bushnell's property. 
32. The filing of federal tax liens against Mr. Bushnell's property caused him 
embarrassment, injured his credit rating, and made it difficult for him to secure loans and 
otherwise use his property. 
33. On December 30, 2005, Barker filed a request for a Collection Due Process 
Hearing in behalf of Mr. Bushnell for issues relating to the collection of taxes owed for 
2000, 2003, and 2004. The IRS determined that the request for Collection Due Process 
Hearing was not timely filed. 
34. In April 2006, Mr. Bushnell terminated his relationship with Barker. 
35. At the time Mr. Bushnell terminated his relationship with Barker, Barker 
had billed Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet a total of $51,675.20. {See supra note 1). 
36. The billing records show two primary categories of billing: one identified 
as "research, conferences, meetings, and correspondences, etc.," and a second identified 
as "compilation and write-up work, etc ." 
37. Mr. Bushnell paid $19,819.80 to Barker for its services.2 
2
 The total payments made by Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet equal $32,500, however, that 
payment included a payment for $12,680.20 for a payment made by Barker to the IRS in 
behalf of John Bushnell personally. As explained below in footnote four, the payments 
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In addition to the facts set forth above, the following facts are relevant to this review: 
38. During the initial consultation, Mr. Barker gave Mr. Bushnell an estimated 
cost of $15,000.00 to prepare the past tax returns, file them with the IRS, and negotiate 
down the penalties and interest. (R. 436 at 498-99; R. 437 at 584, 614). 
39. Mr. Bushnell relied upon Barker to prepare his tax returns correctly. 
m . SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Barker raises six issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court used the correct 
legal standard to determine duties and damages under the contract; (2) whether the 
evidence supports the finding and conclusion that Defendants did not breach their 
contract with Barker; (3) whether the evidence supports the finding and conclusion that 
Barker breached its contract with Bushnell; (4) whether the trial court erred in awarding 
judgment to Bushnell on claims that had previously been dismissed; (5) whether the trial 
court erred in awarding Defendants all of their requested attorney fees; and (6) whether 
the trial court erred in awarding Defendants costs in excess of those traditionally allowed 
by the court. 
As to the first issue, the trial court used the proper legal standard to determine the 
parties' duties and obligations under the ambiguous portions of the contract. The 
made by Mr. Bushnell and to Bushnet are treated as one by Mr. Bushnell due to the fact 
that the payments made by Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet were comingled by Barker, as 
evidenced by inclusion on Bushnet's bill of the $12,680.20 payment made in behalf of 
Mr. Bushnell personally. {See infra note 4) 
12 
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Services Agreement does not specify what tasks must be performed by Barker in 
completing the tax returns and negotiating with the IRS, nor does the Services Agreement 
state the fee that Barker will be paid or the rate at which he will charge for the work 
performed. Because the contract is ambiguous as to those points, it was necessary for the 
trial court to use a reasonable and necessary standard to determine scope of work to be 
performed under the services provision of the contract, and the appropriate amount to be 
billed under the fee provision of the contract. 
As to the second issue, the evidence properly supports the trial court's finding that 
Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet did not breach their contract with Barker. Under the contract, 
Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet had a duty to pay Barker compensation for all services they 
requested Barker to perform. Barker and Bushnet requested that Barker prepare the tax 
returns for 1997 through 2004 for Mr. Bushnell, and to prepare the tax returns for 
Bushnet for 1998 through 2004. Mr. Barker gave Mr. Bushnell an estimate of $15,000 to 
perform the work requested. By the time the parties' relationship ended, Mr. Bushnell 
and Bushnet had paid to Barker approximately $19,819.80 for its services. (See supra 
note 2). The evidence presented by Barker established that it had billed Mr. Bushnell and 
Bushnet over $51,675.20 for its services (see supra note 1); however the evidence did not 
establish that the amount billed was for work that was reasonable and necessary to 
accomplish the task requested by Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet. In fact, the evidence 
13 
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suggests that Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet overpaid for the services they received since the 
evidence established, and the trial court found, that Barker had performed unreasonable 
and unnecessary services and had failed to competently perform the tasks actually 
requested by Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet. 
As to the third issue, the evidence established, and the trial court found, that 
Barker breached its contract with Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet by failing to properly 
prepare the tax returns, missing agreed-upon deadlines to file the returns with the IRS, 
failing to properly negotiate with the IRS, and advising Mr. Bushnell to not pay the taxes 
owed when they were due. 
As to the fourth issue, the trial court did not award judgment to Mr. Bushnell on 
claims that had previously been dismissed. At the close of Mr. Bushnell's case, Barker 
moved to dismiss the counterclaim and third-party action. The trial court dismissed the 
third-party action for breach of contract and negligence against Mr. Barker personally 
and dismissed the counterclaim against Barker for negligence, but denied the motion to 
dismiss as to the counterclaim for breach of contract against Barker. At the close of trial, 
the trial court granted relief to Mr. Bushnell under his breach of contract action - - the 
action it refused to dismiss. Barker argues that although the cause of action was not 
dismissed, the trial court dismissed the grounds for the cause of action. Barker's 
argument fails because the trial court did not exclude any of the evidence that had been 
14 
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presented in support of the breach of contract action, nor did Barker's motion request that 
the trial court exclude any of the evidence presented in support of the breach of contract 
action. Therefore, at the close of trial, the trial court properly made its ruling based upon 
all of the evidence it received through trial. 
As to the fifth issue, the trial court did not err in granting Mr. Bushnell and 
Bushnet all of their attorney fees incurred in connection with resolving the contract 
dispute with Barker, including Mr. Bushnell's defense against Barker's breach of contract 
action and Mr. Bushnell's prosecution of his breach of contract action against Barker. 
The attorney fees awarded by the court are provided for by the unambiguous terms of the 
contract between the parties. 
As to the sixth issue, the trail court did not err in awarding Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet 
all of their costs, even those costs which are not ordinarily awarded to the prevailing 
party under statute. The contract between the parties unambiguously provides that the 
prevailing party is entitled to all of its costs. The trial court properly interpreted the 
contract provision; by including the modifying adjective "all" the contract directs that the 
prevailing party is entitled to receive all costs incurred in defending the action, not 
limited to the costs allowed by statute. 
/// 
/// 
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IV. MARSHALING THE EVIDENCE 
After the trial, Barker filed a motion asking the court to reconsider its judgment 
under Rule 59(a)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure due to "insufficiency of the 
evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that it is against law." Mr. Bushnell 
and Bushnet argued that in order to show an insufficiency of the evidence Barker was 
required to marshal the evidence. To show that the trial court had sufficient evidence for 
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law and its Judgment, Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet 
provided a partial marshaling of the facts. The marshaling provided by Mr. Bushnell and 
Bushnet pointed out evidence that supported the Court's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of law and the Judgment, but it did not provide every shred of evidence in 
support of the conclusions reached by the Court. Under the Rule, Mr. Bushnell and 
Bushnet were not required to provide a complete marshalling of the evidence. In this 
appeal, Barker has used the partial marshaling presented to the trial court by Mr. Bushnell 
and Bushnet in place of its own marshaling of the evidence. In many places in its brief, 
Barker seems more intent in criticizing the partial marshaling than in showing that it has 
marshaled the evidence folly as required by the Rule. 
The partial marshaling of the evidence presented by Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet to 
the trial court does not alleviate Barker's duty to marshal the evidence to this court. Rule 
24 governs appellate briefs, and states in pertinent part, that u[a] party challenging a fact 
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finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding." 
U.R.A.P. 24(a)(9). Utah Courts have confirmed this requirement, stating that "[i]n order 
to challenge a court's factual findings, an appellant must first marshal all the evidence in 
support o/the finding and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to 
support the finding even when viewing it in a light most favorable to the court below." 
Traco Steel Erectors, Inc., v. Comtrol Inc., 175 P.3d 572, 580 (Utah App. 2007) 
(emphasis in original); citing Chen v. Stewart, 100 P.3d 1177 (Utah 2004). 
"[E]ven where the defendants purport to challenge only the legal ruling ... if a 
determination of the correctness of a court's application of a legal standard is extremely 
fact-sensitive, the appellants also have a duty to marshal the evidence." United Park City 
Mines Co., v. Stitching Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 140 P.3d 1200, 1206 (Utah 2006); 
citing Chen v. Stewart, 100 P.3d 1177 (Utah 2004); see also Cache County, v. Beus, 128 
P.3d 63 (Utah App. 2005). Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court has clarified that 
[T]he labels given particular issues by courts or counsel are 
not determinative. Rather, the critical element triggering the 
duty to marshal is factual inquiry. Parties seeking appellate 
review must marshal the evidence on those questions that 
require substantive factual inquiry, regardless of whether 
those questions are reviewed for clear error or abuse of 
discretion. 
United Park City Mines Co., 140 P.3d at 1209. 
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To properly marshal the evidence, an appellant is required to "present, in 
comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial 
which supports the very finding it resists." Traco Steel Erectors, Inc., 175 P.3d at 580; 
citing Chen, 100 P.3d 1177. The Utah Court of Appeals has described the marshaling 
process as follows: 
The process of marshaling is ... fundamentally different from 
that of presenting the evidence at trial. The challenging party 
must temporarily remove its own prejudices and fully 
embrace the adversary's position; he or she must play the 
devil's advocate. In so doing, appellants must present the 
evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court and not 
attempt to construe the evidence in a light favorable to their 
case. Appellants cannot merely present carefully selected 
facts and excerpts from the record in support of their position. 
Nor can they simply restate or review evidence that points to 
an alternate finding or a finding contrary to the trial court's 
finding of fact. 
Burton Lumber & Hardware Company v. Graham, 186 P.3d 1012, 1017 (Utah App. 
2008); citing Chen, 100 P.3d 1177; see also, United Park City Mines Co., 140P.3dat 
1207; Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Association v. Bagley & Company, 182 P.3d 417 
(Utah App. 2008) (holding that appellant did not properly marshal the evidence by simply 
setting forth the evidence supporting its position, providing the opposition's response to 
that evidence, and arguing that the latter was not credible). 
Failure to properly marshal the evidence can result in affirmation of the trial 
court's findings. Traco Steel Erectors, Inc., 175 P.3d at 581; citing Heber City Corp. v. 
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Simpson, 942 P.2d 307 (Utah 1997); Cache County, 128 P.3d 63. Where the appellant 
fails to marshal the evidence, the appellate courts "do not consider those findings 
properly challenged and, therefore, assume the evidence supports them." Chen, 100 P.3d 
at 1181. 
Barker has failed to marshal all of the evidence in support of the trial court's 
findings by failing to present every scrap of evidence in support of the trial court's 
findings. Further, Barker fails to use the evidence that was marshaled to properly support 
the trial court's findings. In most instances, despite the evidence cited by Barker, it asks 
this Court to substitute its conclusions for the conclusions set forth by the trial court. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT USED THE PROPER LEGAL STANDARD TO 
INTERPRET THE PARTIES5 CONTRACT 
At trial, the parties disputed their duties and obligations under the contract. 
(R4651J38). 
In interpreting a contract, the intentions of the parties are 
controlling. John Call Eng'g, Inc. v. Manti City Corp., 743 
P.2d 1205, 1207 (Utah 1987). If the contract is in writing and 
the language is not ambiguous, the intention of the parties 
must be determined from the words of the agreement. See 
Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat'l Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 
1987); Oberhanslv v. Earle, 572 P.2d 1384, 1386 (Utah 
1977). A court may only consider extrinsic evidence if, after 
careful consideration, the contract language is ambiguous or 
uncertain. Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah 
1983). 
Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991). 
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The trial court found that Barker and Bushnell "entered into a Services Agreement on 
or about April 28, 2005, wherein 'Barker agree[d] to perform ... [a]ll requested services 
as set forth by Client and as understood by Barker either express, written, or/and 
implied.'" (R. 461 ^6). The trial court also found that Bushnet and Barker "entered into 
a Services Agreement on or about September 15, 2005, wherein 'Barker agree[d] to 
perform ... [a]ll requested services as set forth by Client and as understood by Barker 
either express, written, or/and implied.'" (R.461 f7). The trial court found that the parties 
had a general agreement that the tasks to be performed under the contract by Barker were 
to prepare the late tax returns for Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet, and to negotiate the payment 
amounts with the IRS if necessary. (R.4611J8). The trial court concluded that although 
the tasks to be performed were generally understood by both parties, the contracts were 
ambiguous in that "other than the general agreement of the task to be performed by 
Barker under the Services Agreement, the Services Agreement does not specifically 
indicate which work must be performed by Barker, nor does it indicate the amount that 
must be paid for the work performed." (R.461 |^9). 
Barker claims that it was legal error for the court to conclude that the language of the 
contract was ambiguous as to the tasks that needed to be performed and the amount that 
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would be paid to Barker. (Appellant Br. at l).3 Barker argues that the contract was clear 
because the parties agreed upon the tasks that were to be performed by Barker. Barker 
posits that a services contract need only set forth the task to be performed, not the manner 
in which the work is performed. (Appellant Br. at 27-28). Barker claims that the 
contract gives it free reign to do whatever work it deems proper to accomplish the tasks at 
hand and to charge Mr. Bushnell for any amount it desires for the work done. Barker 
analogizes its contract with Bushnell and Bushnet to an attorney's contract with a client 
for litigation in that "the contract does not specify what every step of the litigation will be 
comprised of, it simply authorizes the attorney to take the steps he or she deems 
necessary to best represent the client." (Appellant Br. at 27-28). Barker's analogy fails 
to support his point. Although an attorney's contract may not specify each step the 
attorney must take in pursuing litigation, the attorney's work and her fees are clearly 
reviewable under the reasonable and necessary standard (see e.g., Cammack-White v. 
Harbaugh, 184 P.3d 631, 635-36, (Utah Ct. App. 2008)), a standard that Barker contends 
should not apply to his contact or his work performed and fees charged thereunder. 
3
 Although Barker states as the first issue presented for review is "[w]hether the trial court 
used an incorrect legal standard to determine duties and damages under the party's [sic] 
contract[,]" Barker does not address the issue directly. Barker touches on the issue 
lightly in its Summary of the Argument (Appellant Br. at 6), in its argument that Barker 
did not breach the contract by performing the compilation (Appellant Br. at 17), and in its 
argument that it was not required to provide detailed billing (Appellant Br. at 26-28). 
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The language of a contract is considered ambiguous if the contract language is 
'insufficient in a sense that the contract may be understood to reach two or more 
plausible meanings.'" Metropolitan Property & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Finlayson, 751 P.2d 254, 
257 (Utah Ct.App.1988) (quoting Central Sec. Mut. Ins. Co. v. DePinto, 235 Kan. 331, 
681 P.2d 15, 17(1984)). 
If a contract is ambiguous and the trial court finds facts 
regarding the parties' intentions based on evidence extrinsic to 
the contract itself, those findings may not be set aside on 
appeal unless they are clearly erroneous under Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 52(a). Porter v. Groover, 734 P.2d 464, 465 
& n. 1 (Utah 1987); Circle Airfreight v. Boyce Equipment, 
745 P.2d 828 (Utah Ct.App.1987). However, a trial court's 
interpretation of the words of an unambiguous, integrated 
contract is a question of law, which is reviewed on appeal for 
correctness. Kimball v. Campbell 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 
1985). See Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs.. 752 P.2d 
892 (Utah 1988). Whether ambiguity exists in a contract is 
itself a question of law. Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 
1292,1293 (Utah 1983). 
Crowther v. Carter, 767 P.2d 129, 131 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 
As the court in Crowther points out, the trial court's determination that ambiguity 
existed in the contract as to the work be performed by Barker and the amount that would 
be charged for that work is a question of law. Therefore the first issue that must be 
analyzed is whether the trial court properly concluded that the contract between the 
parties is ambiguous. 
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"[T]he fact that the parties differ as to the interpretation of an agreement does not 
alone establish that ambiguity exists." Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d at 109 (citing, 
Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs., 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988). However, as the 
court in Metropolitan Property & Liability pointed out, a contract is ambiguous if the 
contract language may be "understood to reach two or more plausible meanings." Id 
In the present case, the contract is ambiguous as to the work to be performed under 
the contract, and it is ambiguous as to the amount that Barker would be paid for the work. 
The trial court found: "[o]ther than the general agreement of the task to be performed by 
Barker under the Services Agreement, the Services Agreement does not specifically 
indicate which work must be performed by Barker, nor does it indicate the amount that 
must be paid for the work performed." (R.461]f9). 
a. The Trial Court Correctly Interpreted the Work to be Performed 
Under the Contract 
The Services Agreement sets forth the work to be performed under the 
contract as follows: 
Barker agrees to perform the following services for the 
Client, including such additional services related thereto 
which are reasonably required: 
(a.)All requested services as set forth by Client and as understood 
by Barker either express, written, or/and implied. Also, the 
acceptance of all prior services and billings rendered by 
Barker. 
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A plain reading of the contract demonstrates that it is void of any particulars that 
would allow the Court to determine what services Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet expected 
Barker to perform, or what services Barker expected to perform under the contract. In 
summary, the contract states that Barker will perform those services which he understood 
were requested by the Client. The contract language begs for parole evidence since the 
services to be performed by Barker cannot be determined by looking at the contractual 
language alone. Without defining what the project is the contract states "I'll do the 
project, and you'll pay me." (R.452 at 3). 
Barker disagrees with the trial court's conclusion and argues that it is enough for 
the contract to state that Barker was to be paid "fees on a project by project basis..." 
(Appellant Br. at 11). However, without a definition as to the services that will be 
performed by Barker, or even the project to be undertaken by Barker, the obligations of 
Barker are ambiguous, or as the court in Metropolitan Property & Liability stated: 
"[Barker's obligations may be] understood to reach two or more plausible meanings." Id-
Therefore, due to the fact that the terms of the contract do not define the project, or 
the services to be performed by Barker, the contract is ambiguous. 
b. The Trial Court Correctly Interpreted that Nothing More was Due Under 
the Contract 
The trail court also found that the contract between the parties is ambiguous 
because it does not indicate the amount Barker will charge for the work, or the hourly fee 
24 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
it will charge for performing tasks. It is proper to conclude that the payment provision of 
a contract is ambiguous if the contract does not clearly define how the payments are to be 
calculated. See Peterson v. Sunrider Corp., 48 P.3d 918, 926 n.7 (Utah 2002) (the 
contract was found to be ambiguous because, among other reasons, it gave no indication 
of how the payments were to be calculated). 
The Services Agreement states with respect to fees, in pertinent part: 
As compensation for all services (Including Telephone 
Conferences) rendered by Barker pursuant to this agreement, 
Client shall pay to Barker on the terms and conditions 
contained herein; fees on a project by project basis in which 
the work performed by Barker shall constitute a major factor 
and in which the ultimate outcome may be factored into the 
fees charged, which fees may be adjusted annually by mutual 
agreement between Client and Barker. 
A plain reading of the contract demonstrates that it is void of any particulars that 
would allow the Court to determine what amounts Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet owe to 
Barker for his work on the undefined project. In summary, the contract states that Barker 
will perform those services which he understood were requested by the client. The 
contract language on fees also begs for parole evidence since the fee provision does not 
define a billing rate or a flat fee, and relies upon the ambiguous services provision of the 
contract as an anchor for its definition. Again, the trial court properly defined the 
contract when it said it was basically an agreement that "I'll do the project, and you'll 
pay me." (R.452 at 3). 
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The trial court properly concluded that the contract's fees provision was 
ambiguous since the amount to be paid to Barker "[may be] understood to reach two or 
more plausible meanings." Metropolitan Property & Liability. 
c. The Trial Court Correctly Interpreted the Ambiguous Portions of 
the Contract 
After looking at the contract, the trial court properly concluded that the ambiguous 
provisions were the project to be completed, the services to be performed by Barker, and 
the fees to be paid to Barker. Based on parole evidence submitted at trial, the trial court 
determined that there was no real dispute as to the definition of the project to be 
completed because "[t]he parties agreed that the [project] to be performed by Barker was 
to prepare the late tax returns for Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet, and to negotiate the payment 
amounts with the IRS if necessary." (R. 461 *[} 8). However, there was a dispute between 
the parties as to the services which were to be performed to complete the project, and the 
amount Barker was to be paid to complete the project. (R. 452 at 2, 3; 465 ^ f 38). 
Therefore the trial court's task was to define the parties' intentions under the services 
provision and the fee provision of the contract. The trial court determined that the 
services to be performed to complete the project and the fees to be charged for those 
services were to be interpreted under a reasonable and necessary standard. (R.452 at 4). 
As pointed out in Porter v. Groover, 734 P.2d at 465, n.l, the trial court's finding 
of facts as to the parties' intentions under an ambiguous contract may not be set aside on 
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appeal unless the findings are clearly erroneous under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
52(a). Id. Barker has failed to show that the trial court's findings are clearly erroneous 
under Rule 52(a), of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
i. The Trial Court Correctly Interpreted Barker's Duties 
Under the Contract 
Much of the contention between the parties lies in the amount of time spent 
by Barker in "Research , Conferences, and Meetings, Etc." and in "Compilation 
and Write-Up Work, Etc." Although Barker represented to Mr. Bushnell and 
Bushnet that he was an expert in dealing with the IRS (R. 435 at 339-40; R. 437 at 
585-87), and although he only met with Mr. Bushnell two times in person, and 
four or five times over the telephone (R. 436 at 515), he billed $31,020.00 to Mr. 
Bushnell and Bushnet for "Research, Conferences, and Meetings, Etc." 
Barker clams that the language in the contract allows him to do whatever work it 
chooses to do to accomplish the task requested by the parties. (Appellant Br. at 27, 32). 
Barker argues that the trial court "reform[ed] the contract" by concluding that there was a 
limit as to the work it could perform. (Appellant Br. at 32). Barker argues that it was at 
liberty to perform any work it deemed appropriate. (Appellant Br. at 32). 
Barker arguments are incorrect. Even under the language of the contract itself, 
Barker was limited to performing additional services only if they are "reasonably 
required." (Services Agreement ]fl). At trial, Barker acknowledged that limitation in the 
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contract. (R. 435 at 248) (acknowledging that it was charged with preparing eight tax 
returns and other "required" work). Therefore, the language of the contract does not 
grant Barker free reign to perform any task it deems necessary. The task must be 
reasonably required. Thus, the trial court correctly used the reasonableness standard to 
evaluate whether certain tasks were necessary under the contract. 
Barker posits that a breach of contract can only be found if the work is "performed 
outside of legal, or at a bare minimum, generally accepted standard." (Appellant Br. at 
18). Therefore, Barker acknowledges that some type of reasonable standard must be 
applied to its duties under the contract. Although Barker acknowledges that some 
reasonable standard must be used, it would set the bar much lower than the trial court. 
Thus, Barker's contention with the trial court's findings is not that it used a reasonable 
standard, but that it set the bar too high when setting its reasonable standard. Even 
though Barker may disagree with the trial court's definition of reasonable, it has not 
shown that the trial court clearly erred by setting its bar where it did. 
Barker has failed to show that the trial court's findings with respect to the work to 
be performed under the contract were clearly erroneous under Rule 52(a) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
1. The Trial Court Correctly Concluded that the 
Compilation was not Reasonably Necessary 
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Barker billed Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet $16,770 for the "Compilation and Write-
Up Work, Etc." The trial court found that the compilation was not reasonable and 
necessary in order to complete the project under the contract. Barker first argues that 
performing the compilation was called for under the contract because u[n]othing in the 
contract precludes [Barker] from providing more services than are needed." (Appellant 
Br. at 17). That alone is not reason to perform the compilation. Indeed, if one follows 
Barker's argument to the logical extreme, Barker could charge Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet 
to build a rocket to the moon because the contract does not preclude such action. 
Barker's argument in this regard reveals that it treated this contract as one that 
allowed it to do whatever work it desired at Mr. Bushnell's and Bushnet's expense. 
Barker's argument misses the point. The basis for Barker's breach of contract action was 
that it was obligated to prepare the compilation under the contract and should be 
compensated for the work. Therefore, the question before the trial court on Barker's 
breach of contract action in this regard is whether the parties had agreed that Barker 
would undertake the compilation, and whether Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet would pay 
Barker for the compilation. The contract with respect to the compilation is silent; in fact, 
the contract with respect to any work Barker performed is silent. {Supra at 23). The trial 
court concluded that the compilation would only be considered to be an obligation under 
the contract if it was reasonable and necessary to accomplish the task of preparing the tax 
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returns and negotiating with the IRS. {Supra at 26). Upon weighing the evidence, the 
trial court found that the compilation was not reasonable and necessary. 
Barker argues that the compilation was necessary because the Quicken information 
did not "tie" into the tax returns. (Appellant Br. at 25). Barker's argument fails to 
connect on a number of points. 
It first must be pointed out that his argument puts the cart before the horse, so to 
speak. Barker's contention with the Quicken information is that the expenses in Quicken 
do not tie into the expenses posted on the tax returns. (Appellant Br. at 25). However, 
other than the information provided by the Quicken disk, Barker did not have Mr. 
Bushnell and Bushnet's expense information prior to commencing the work on the tax 
returns. Expert witness Keith Prescott testified that "[w]hat happens in these cases is the 
Internal Revenue Service, of course, doesn't know what your deductions are so they list 
all your income." (R. 435 at 369-70). Nothing in the information given to Barker by Mr. 
Bushnell or by the IRS, would give Barker an indication that the expense information 
organized by Quicken was incorrect. 
In fact, the evidence suggested that the Quicken information was very reliable. 
Denise Naylor testified that she has organized information and entered it into Quicken for 
a number of CPAs. (R. 437 at 610). She testified that she obtained all of Mr. Bushnell's 
receipts, bank statements, copies of checks, and all other financial information for the 
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years 1997 through 2004 and organized the information by type. (R. 437 at 611-12). 
Once the information was organized, Ms. Naylor entered all of the data into Quicken. (R. 
437 at 612). 
Even if one compares the Quicken information to the tax return, one would not 
expect the information to tie over directly without first doing some background work. 
Expert witness Keith Prescott testified that one should start with the Quicken information 
and then sit down with the taxpayer and go through the information to prepare the tax 
returns. (R. 436 at 397). Mr. Prescott explained that it is imperative to sit down with the 
client to have an "in depth discussion of what his business and investments might be... 
[because as a CPA I will never know as much about a man's business as he will 
know.. .it's not possible to adequately represent a taxpayer without sitting down with that 
taxpayer and understanding the documentation that they have." (R. 435 at 349, 358). 
Barker had no reason to believe that the information on Quicken was incorrect because he 
never sat down with Mr. Bushnell to review his receipts and inquire as to which receipts 
represented business expenses and which represented personal expenses. (R. 436 at 515). 
Even if the compilation was authorized, it was not properly prepared by Barker 
because no one ever sat down with Mr. Bushnell to discuss his business and his various 
expenses. Without discussing those issues with Mr. Bushnell, Barker had no way of 
knowing which receipts were personal expenses and which were business expenses. 
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In fact, a review of the tax returns, the Quicken data, and the compilation prepared 
by Barker reveal that the Quicken information ties into the tax returns more closely than 
the compilations prepared by Barker. (R. 435 at 372 - 388). With all of the work Barker 
claims went into the compilation and the enormous amount of fees charged by Barker for 
this work, one would expect the compilation number to tie directly into the tax returns. 
(R. 435 at 389). 
Due to the fact that the compilations were not necessary to complete Mr. Bushnell 
and Bushnet's tax returns, the trial court correctly concluded that the Mr. Bushnell and 
Bushnet are not obligated to pay Barker for preparation of the compilations Further, the 
fact that the compilations do not tie into the tax returns also supports the trial court's 
conclusion that Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet do not have an obligation to pay for Barker for 
the compilation's preparation. 
2. The Trial Court Correctly Concluded that Barker 
failed to show that the "Research, Conferences, and 
Meetings, Etc." were Reasonable and Necessary 
Barker charged Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet $31,020 for "Research, Conferences, 
Meetings, and Correspondences, Etc." The trial court concluded that it was unable to 
conclude that the research, conferences, and meetings were reasonable and necessary to 
accomplish the project agreed to by the parties. (R. 452 at 5-6). This issue is more fully 
discussed in the following section. To prevent a duplication of the argument here, it is 
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sufficient to say that Barker failed to show through its billings that the research, 
conferences and meetings were reasonable and necessary to prepare Mr. Bushnell and 
Bushnet's tax returns and to negotiate with the IRS. Without significant details in the 
billing statements (of which there is little or none), the trial court found that it was 
unreasonable that a CPA would charge a client over $30,000 for research, conferences, 
and meetings. 
ii. The Trial Court Correctly Concluded that Mr, Bushnell and 
Bushnet did not Owe any Additional Fees to Barker 
As previously discussed, the trial court was required to interpret the fees provision 
of the contract due to obvious ambiguities in that provision.. Barker argues that the trial 
court erred in finding that there was not sufficient evidence to support his claim for its 
fees because Barker had provided evidence of the work performed and the amount 
charged for that work. Barker's argument fails to properly identify the trial court's 
reasoning in finding that the evidence did not support Barker's claim for breach of 
contract. The trial court found that under an ambiguous contract such as the one at issue, 
it is the plaintiffs burden to show that the fees he is seeking are reasonable and 
necessary." (R. 452 at 3, 4). The trial court then found that it was not shown by Barker 
that it was entitled to be paid more than it had already been paid by Mr. Bushnell and 
Bushnet. Therefore, although evidence had been presented that demonstrated that Barker 
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billed Mr. Bushnell for work performed, that evidence did not establish that the work was 
done and that it was reasonable and necessary to accomplish the task contacted for. 
The trial court found that the Plaintiff billed Bushnell and Bushnet $64,355.20 (see 
supra note 2). (R. 464 lj 35; R. 452 at 4). The trial court further found that the amount 
that had been paid on those bills was $32,500.00 (see supra note 2). (R. 465 j^ 36; R. 452 
at 4-5).4 The trial court pointed out that the issue before it was whether the work 
performed by Barker was reasonably and necessary to perform the task to be performed. 
4
 Barker treats the billings to Mr. Bushnell and the payments credited to Mr. Bushnell 
separately from the billings to Bushnet and the payments credited to Bushnet. However, 
the trial court did not treat the billings and payment credits for Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet 
separately. There is a good reason for the court's decision onto to separate the Bushnell 
billings and payments from the Bushnet billings and payments. 
A review of the billings and payments as compared to the work billed for reveals 
that Barker applied payments by Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet to one account or the other 
arbitrarily. For example, all work toward the compilation was billed under Bushnet, 
however, Barker argues (and admitted at trial) that the compilation was necessary to 
prepare Mr. BushnelPs tax returns correctly. (Appellant Br. at 29-31; R. 435 at 248) (Mr. 
Barker testifying that spending 30 to 35 hours per return is reasonable considering they 
were "forensic type returns"). Further, a review of the billing to Bushnet shows that 
many of the payments applied to Bushnet could have (or arguably should have) been 
applied to Mr. Bushnell. For example, Barker paid the IRS $12,680.20 in behalf of John 
K. Bushnell for amounts owing on his taxes from the years 1995 and 1996. However, the 
charge for that payment, and the application of Mr. Bushnell's reimbursement check to 
Barker for that amount was placed on Bushnet's account. It is also interesting to note, 
that even though the contract between Barker and Bushnet was not signed until 
September 2005, $20,320.00 in payments received prior to September of 2005 were 
applied to Bushnet's account. 
Barker fails to recognize the good reasons the court did not distinguish between 
the billings and payment credits of Mr. Bushnell and to Bushnet, and Barker fails to 
marshal the evidence supporting those good reasons. 
34 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In determining whether the work performed for the amount billed was reasonable and 
necessary, the trial court found that there were two general categories of the billings: the 
general category of "research, conferences, meetings, etc.," and the "compilation" 
category. 
In reviewing these two categories, the trial court found that it could not conclude 
that amount billed under the category of "research, conference, meetings, etc." was 
reasonable and necessary; therefore, even though it could conclude that work was bill for, 
it could not find that the work done was reasonable and necessary beyond that which was 
paid. (R. 466 Ht 45, 46; R. 452 at 5-6). 
Barker argues that the trial court erred because its Exhibit 50 contained more 
detailed information, thus suggesting that the trial court should have categorized the bills 
into more than two categories. Barker's argument fails for a number of reasons. First, 
Barker does not show that there is insufficient evidence to support the trial court's ruling. 
The trial court stated that its finding was based upon the deficiency of the detail in the 
billing records, and the fact that there was no additional evidence to support the claim 
that Barker was entitled to more money than that which he was paid. (R. 452 at 4-6). 
Although the Court does not specifically refer to any exhibits in its ruling, it is assumed 
that it took into consideration all the exhibits prior to its ruling. For that reason, without a 
marshaling of the evidence by Barker to show that there is insufficient evidence to 
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support the claim, it must be assumed that the record supports the findings of the trial 
court. See Ostermiller v. Ostermiller, 190 P.3d 13 (Utah Ct. App. 2008) ("because Wife 
fails to marshal the evidence in support of this finding, we must assume that the finding is 
adequately supported by the evidence."). Nevertheless, even if one is to look into the 
record and Exhibit 50, it is clearly identifiable that there is not sufficient evidence to 
conclude that the research, conferences, and meetings were reasonable and necessary to 
accomplish the project under the contract. A review of the entries in Exhibit 50 does not 
shed light upon the question of whether the work was reasonable and necessary to 
complete the task to be performed by Barker. Therefore, Exhibit 50 does not add any 
additional information sufficient to disturb the trial court's ruling. 
d. The Trial Court Correctly Concluded that the Acknowledgement of 
Fees signed by Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet was not a Waiver 
Barker argues that the trial court ignored evidence that Mr. Bushnell and 
Bushnet accepted the charges as made. (Appellant Br. At 32). Barker's 
contention is based in Exhibits 66 through 74, which are a series of letters 
prepared by Barker and signed by Bushnell. The letters contain the statement "it 
is acknowledged and again accepted all the terms of your standard Acceptance of 
Service Agreement and we hereby reinitiate all terms and conditions of that 
agreement . . . those terms and conditions include but are not limited to the 
acceptance of all billings and services to date." Barker argues that Mr. Bushnell 
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and Bushnet waived their right to contest the billing amount by signing letters with 
the above language indicating acceptance. 
The trial court considered Barker's argument in this regard in its ruling. It 
concluded that the letters do not constitute a waiver because a waiver would 
require more specificity than the blanket statement "I'm going to pay the bill." On 
that basis, the trial court found that there was not a knowing waiver of that right by 
acceptance. (R. 452 at 8-9). 
"A waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right." Soter's, Inc. 
v. Deseret Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 857 P.2d 935, 939-40 (Utah 1993) 
(citations omitted). The question of waiver is "intensely fact dependent." IHC 
Health Services, Inc. v. D & K Management, Inc., 73 P.3d 320, 323 (Utah 2003). 
"[U]nlike most cases, the legal conclusions underlying a trial court's grant of 
summary judgment on a waiver issue are reviewed with some measure of 
deference." Id 
In order to show that Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet had relinquished a right, 
Barker had to show (1) there was an existing right, benefit, or advantage; (2) there 
was knowledge of the existing right, benefit, or advantage; and (3) there was an 
intent to relinquish the right, benefit, or advantage. Soter's 857 P.2d at 940. 
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The question surrounding this issue is whether Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet 
accepted the tax returns and the work done to prepare the tax returns by signing 
the letters. It would have been impossible for Mr. Barker and Bushnet to 
knowingly waive their right to contest the accuracy of the tax returns or the work 
done to prepare the tax returns. At trial, Mr. Bushnell testified that he did not have 
an understanding as to why he was signing the letters. (R. 437 at 579). In fact, 
due to Barker's rush to get the tax returns filed, Mr. Bushnell did not have a 
chance to review the letter or his tax returns before they were filed. (R. 436 at 512 
- 17). Without the opportunity to review the tax returns, or take them to another 
expert to verify that the work was done correctly, Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet could 
not have waived their right to contest the work through acceptance. 
Therefore, due to the fact that Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet did not understand 
why they were signing the letters, and due to the fact that they did not have 
sufficient time to review the work at that point, the trial court correctly concluded 
that Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet did not waive their right to dispute the fees charged 
by Barker by singing the letters contained in Exhibits 66 through 74. 
VI. BARKER'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WERE NOT VIOLATED 
Barker argues that its due process rights were violated because the trial court 
dismissed the bases of Appellee's counterclaim for breach of contract in its Rule 50 
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motion. (Appellant Br. at 16). Barker argues that the trial court dismissed several bases 
for the Appellee's counterclaim when it commented in its denial of Barker's Rule 50 
motion that there was a question as to "whether the contract has been breached because 
Mr. Barker has in an unprofessional manner, unnecessary unreasonably did this 
compilation." (R. 437 at 705). Barker is incorrect. 
Barker sought to discharge Mr. Bushnell's cause of action for breach of contract 
through Rule 50(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.. Rule 50(a) allows a party to 
move for directed verdict at the close of the evidence offered by an opponent. Generally, 
a Rule 50(a) motion is reserved for only a jury trial since the motion contemplates the 
court to direct the jury to return a verdict for a party. Grossen v. DeWitt 982 P.2d 581, 
584 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). However, a motion brought under Rule 50(a) in a bench trial 
is considered under Rule 41(b). Id Rule 41(b) states that 
[ajfter the plaintiff, in an action tried by the court without 
a jury, has completed the presentation of his evidence the 
defendant, without waiving his right to offer evidence in the 
event the motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal on 
the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has 
shown no right to relief. The court as trier of the facts may 
then determine them and render judgment against the plaintiff 
or may decline to render any judgment until the close of all 
the evidence. 
The trial court, by denying the Barker's motion, declined to render any judgment until the 
close of all the evidence. Id Therefore, by declining to render any judgment on the 
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breach of contract claim until the close of evidence, the breach of contract claim 
remained intact. In fact, Rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that "every 
final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is 
entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings." In this case Mr. 
Bushnell had demanded relief for breach of contract and had introduced evidence to 
support the claim. The court relied upon sufficient evidence in its finding and found that 
Plaintiff had breached its contract. 
Even if a court were able to dismiss the various bases for a cause of action under 
Rule 41, the trial court did not limit itself in this instance. In rendering its decision on 
Barker's request for dismissal of Mr. Bushnell's counterclaim, the trial court stated that 
Barker was to perform these services in a workmanlike 
manner and that he failed to do that, that he missed deadlines, 
that - but more specifically, he performed a services that was 
unnecessary and unreasonable. It was the compilation of the 
records that hew as given, a compilation of those records. So 
he breached the agreement in several ways in an 
unworkmanlike manner but specifically I think for this 
analysis the claim comes down to this and that is you 
performed a compilation at some considerable expense and 
consideration number of hours and that was unnecessary and 
not reasonable in light of the circumstances and 
consequentially was not a workmanlike job in dealing with 
tax returns. 
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(R. 437 at 701). Although the trial court focused its comments on the compilation, it is 
clear that it was also contemplating the other claims for breach of contract such as the 
missed deadlines and the inaccurate preparation of Bushnell's tax returns. 
VII. BARKER BREACHED ITS CONTRACT WITH MR. BUSHNELL AND 
BUSHNET 
The trial court found that Barker failied to perform the tasks under the contract 
in a workman like manner by failing to meet deadlines that it had agreed upon with the 
IRS, failing to meet other dedlies set by the IRS, failing to prevent federal tax liens from 
being recorded against Mr. Bushnell's property, failing to prepare th 1999 tax return, and 
failing toproperly prepare the 2004 tax return." R. 468 at f^ 55). Barker argues that the 
breaches mentioned by the trail court do not constitute a breach of contract as a matter of 
law. (Appellant Br. at 18-20). 
Barker first argues that the it was not an error to file the tax returns late because 
the contract did not specify a specific date when they needed to be filed. (Appellant Br. 
at 18). As pointed out above, the contract is ambiguous as to the obligations of the 
parties. However, the trial court determined trough parole evidence that the task to be 
performed was to prepare the tax returns for Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet, negotiate with 
the IRS, and specifically to avoid the filing of federal tax liens. 
After making initial contact with the IRS, Barker agreed upon a deadline of June 
24, 2005 to submit the tax returns to the IRS. (R. 434 at 154). Barker was not able to 
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meet that deadline and so he wrote a letter on June 22, 2005 to request an extension of 
time to file. (R. 434 at 167). Barker failed to file the tax returns by August 19, 2005. (R. 
434 at 167-68). Barker did not receive an extension of the August 19, 2005 deadline. 
Due to missing that deadline, the IRS served a summons on Mr. Bushnell and escalated 
their enforcement of the collections against Mr. Bushnell. That event, coupled with a 
number of subsequent events led to the filing of federal tax liens on Mr. Bushnell's 
property. Barker, claiming to be an expert with dealing with the IRS, had agreed to 
prepare and submit the tax returns, and to negotiate with the IRS. By failing to file the 
tax returns by the agreed upon date, Barker breached his agreement with Mr. Bushnell 
and Bushnet in this regard. 
Barker argues that the filing of the 1999 tax return with an error in the reporting 
of income was not a breach of contract. (Appellant Br. at 18-19). Barker's argument is 
not clear, but he appears to take the position that the error could have been remedied 
quickly with notice, and therefore it was not a breach of the contract. Barker's argument 
fails to explain why Barker's failure to properly prepare the 1999 tax return is not a 
breach of the parties' contract. Barker had agreed to prepare Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet's 
tax returns, Barker failed to prepare the 1999 tax return correctly, and therefore he 
breached his contract. Mr. Bushnell later had to hire the services of another CPA to 
handle the mistake. 
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Barker argues that it did not breach its contract with Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet 
by indicating that Bushnet was a S corporation on Mr. Bushnell's 2004 tax return. 
(Appellant Br. at 19). Barker argues that it is not a mistake because one may make a 
retroactive S election. Nevertheless, Barker failed to make the retroactive S election and 
therefore the tax return was filed in error. (R. 435 at 274). Since Barker failed to 
properly prepare Mr. Bushnell's 2004 tax return by showing that Bushnet was an S 
corporation, it breached its contract with Mr. Bushnell. Further, it should be noted that 
even after going to the extensive effort of preparing the compilation for Bushnet, Barker 
failed to properly prepare the tax return for Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet. 
As to the final point, Barker argues that he was not at fault for the filing of the 
tax liens because Mr. Bushnell said he did not have enough money to pay the past taxes 
and the current taxes as well. (Appellant Br. at 20). This is a classic instance where 
Barker fails to marshal the evidence in favor of the trial court's findings. Mr. Bushnell 
testified that he repeatedly told Barker that he had the money to pay the taxes owing. (R. 
436 at 497-98). He also testified that he relied upon Barker to tell him when to pay the 
taxes. (R. 437 at 578). Even though Mr. Bushnell had the money to pay, Barker advised 
him not to pay the taxes so that it had leverage to negotiate some of the penalties and 
interest owing. (R. 436 at 523). Therefore, the evidence relied upon by the trial court 
establishes that Mr. Bushnell had the money to pay his past taxes but did not pay them 
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due to the fact that Barker advised him not to pay immediately. Mr. Bushnell did not pay 
the taxes immediately and the IRS filed a tax lien against his property. Barker breached 
his contract with Mr. Bushnell by advising him not to pay the amounts owing to the IRS. 
VIII. THE ATTONEY FEES AWARDED TO MR. BUSHNELL AND 
BUSHNET WERE AWARDED PROPERLY PURSUANT TO THE 
CONTRACT 
Barker argues that the trial court's award of attorney fees to Mr. Bushnell was 
excessive. The award of attorney fees to Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet were made pursuant 
to the parties' contract. Further, the amount of the attorney fees awarded was not 
excessive. 
a. Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet had a Right to Attorney Fees Under the 
Contract 
Attorney fees are awarded to the prevailing party when they are provided by 
statute or by contract. See Stewart v. Utah Public Service Comm'n, 885 P.2d 759 (Utah 
1994). Additionally, in the absence of statute or a contract providing for attorney fees, 
courts may award attorney fees when justice or equity requires. Id Pursuant to the 
contract between the parties, Mr. Bushnell has a contractual right to costs and attorney 
fees relating to Barker's claim and Mr. Bushnell's counterclaim. 
The contract provision at issue states "In the event of a breach of this Agreement, the 
non-defaulting party shall be entitled to all costs and attorneys' fees incurred in enforcing 
this Agreement or in seeking any other remedy." (Service Agreement f^ 8). In order to 
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determine whether Mr. Bushnell is entitled to attorney fees, this provision must be 
interpreted. 
"If the language within the four corners of the contract is unambiguous, the parties' 
intentions are determined from the plain meaning of the contractual language, and the 
contract may be interpreted as a matter of law." Green River Canal Co. v. Thayn, 84 
P.3d 1134, 1141(Utah 2003) (citations and internal quotations omitted). Paragraph 8 of 
the Services Agreement is unambiguous. It provides that the non-defaulting party shall 
be entitled to all costs and attorney fees incurred in enforcing the agreement or in seeking 
any other remedy. 
The court may look at the two causes of action together to determine which party is 
the non-defaulting party and entitled to attorney fees. See Mountain States Broadcasting 
Company v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 556 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (looked at result of primary 
claim and counterclaim to determine which party was the "prevailing party."). That 
approach clarifies the issue: Barker brought a cause of action against Mr. Bushnell for 
breach of contract, and Mr. Bushnell brought a cause of action against Barker for breach 
of contract. After a full trial, the Court determined that Barker breached the contract and 
that Bushnell did not breach the contract. Therefore, pursuant to the contract, Mr. 
Bushnell is entitled to his costs and attorney fees incurred in the action as a matter of 
right. 
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b. The Amount of Attorney Fees Awarded was not Excessive 
The trial court awarded Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet all of their attorney fees 
relating to the defense of the breach of contract action brought by Barker, and it awarded 
to Mr. Bushnell all of his attorney fees for pursuing his beach of contract action brought 
against Barker. The total amount awarded for attorney fees was $79,108.50. 
Barker argues that it was not reasonable to have two attorneys working on 
Bushnell's case, and that the due to the "relative lack of complexity involved in this 
matter" the attorney fees should be reduced. (Appellant Br. at 35). It is interesting to 
note that although Barker is now calling foul regarding the amount of fees awarded to 
Mr. Bushnell, Barker requested the Court to award to it over $81,523.50 for "BILLING 
TIME DURING LAST TWO YEARS IN PREPARING FOR COURT." (R. 434 at 109, 
Addendum 1). Considering the fact that Barker claimed that it necessarily billed over 
$64,000.00 to get Mr. Bushnell's tax returns ready for the IRS, it would seem that it had a 
very intimate knowledge of the case. Even with that intimate knowledge, Barker billed 
another $81,523.50 for "the charges of time since we've been trying to resolve the 
matter." (R. 434 at 108). In light of that fact alone, it is noteworthy that Mr. Bushnell 
and Bushnet's attorneys, who had no previous knowledge of the case prior to their 
involvement, billed only $79,108.50 to litigate the case completely. Further, it is likewise 
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noteworthy that Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet's accounting professionals, with no previous 
knowledge of the case, billed only $25,180.45. 
Barker takes issue with some of the specific billing for attorney fees. Barker 
argues that the trial court should not have awarded Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet attorney 
fees in the amount of $1,048.50 for "pre complaint [sic] services." (Appellant Br. at 34). 
It is not clear as to which fees Barker objects specifically, but it is assumed that the 
dispute includes all fees from April 11, 2006 through June 13, 2006. However, it should 
be noted that the sum of those fees equals $ 1,204.50. 
Barker's argument fails under the provision of the contract, which provides that 
" . . . the non-defaulting party shall be entitled to all costs and attorneys' fees incurred in 
enforcing this agreement or in seeking any other remedy." (Appellant Br. at Addendum 
D). Even though the $1,048.50 in attorney fees complained of by Barker were not 
incurred after the Complaint had been filed, they were incurred in connection with 
enforcing the agreement. 
Barker argues that there were seven entries that it believes only pertain to the 
Third-Party Complaint. Of the seven entries contested by Barker, only three of them 
should not have been included. The entry on 7/12/06 by JW to "Review & Revise 
Complaint, Countercomplaint" is properly included in the request for fees since Mr. 
Bushnell is entitle to an award of the costs and attorney fees relating to Barker claim and 
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his counterclaim. The entry on 7/14/06 by RL to "finalize Barker Summons and arrange 
for its service" should not have been included since it only pertains to the Third-Party 
Complaint. The entry on 8/01/06 by JW for "Tel conf w/ client; Tel conf w/ D. Coulter 
re additional Plaintiffs against Barker conf w/ D. Hirschi" are proper since the discussion 
related to work done by Barker. Further, even if some of the information related to Mr. 
Barker, it was so inextricably linked to Barker's claim and Mr. Bushnell's counterclaim 
that it should be included. The entry on 8/10/06 by JW to Review Answer of Barker; Tel 
conf w/ Turner; Review Scheduling Order" is proper because Barker's Answer to the 
counterclaim, the telephone conference with Barker's counsel and a review of the 
scheduling order relate to Barker claim and Mr. Bushnell's counterclaim or involve 
issues that are so inextricably linked to Barker's claim and Mr. Bushnell's counterclaim 
that it should be included. The entry on 4/1/08 by AMW for the "preparation of motion 
for directed verdict. Research regarding speculative damages" should be included 
because it relates directly to Barker's complaint and the Rule 50 Motion that was made at 
the close of Barker's case. The entry on 4/02/08 and 4/03/08 should not have been 
included because they only relate to the Third-Party Complaint against Mr. Barker. Mr. 
Moss has prepared an Amended Declaration which has removed the improper inclusion 
of the entries on 7/14/06, 4/02/08, and 4/03/08. 
/// 
48 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IX. THE COSTS AWARDED BY THE TRIAL COURT WERE NOT 
EXCESSIVE 
As stated above, it is interesting to note that although Barker is now calling foul 
regarding the costs awarded to Mr. Bushnell, Barker requested the Court to award to it 
over $81,523.50 for its time spent in pursuing the action. It is also interesting to note that 
the $81,523.50 represents time spent Barker, who was already familiar with the case. 
The contract under which the cause of action is based states that "In the event of a 
breach of this Agreement, the non-defaulting party shall be entitled to all costs and 
attorneys' fees incurred in enforcing this Agreement or in seeking any other remedy." 
(Service Agreement ]f 8; attached hereto as exhibit A). Expert witness fees are allowed 
by the contract by its inclusion of the language "all costs." The fees paid to an expert 
witness to prepare, attend, and testify at trial is a cost incurred to enforce (or defend) the 
agreement. 
X. MR. BUSHNELL AND BUSHNET ARE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS' 
FEESONAPPEAL 
It is undisputed that the Agreements contain a provision for attorneys' fees. 
(Addendum D "Acceptance of Service Agreement" at *[[8) The Trial Court awarded Mr. 
Bushnell and Bushnet their attorneys' fees in the case below. (R. 472). It is well 
established that "[t]he general rule is that when a party who received attorney fees below 
prevails on appeal, the party is also entitled to fees reasonably incurred on appeal." Utah 
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Dept. of Social Services v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193, 1197 (Utah App. 1991); citing 
Management Servs. V. Development Assocs., 617 P.2d 406, 408-9 (Utah 1980); see also 
Valcare v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305 (Utah 1998). Accordingly, Mr. Bushnell and 
Bushnet hereby request that this Court award them the reasonable attorneys' fees and 
costs they has incurred in this appeal. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet respectfully request that 
Barker's appeal be denied, that this Court uphold the trial court's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and the Judgment issued by the trial court, and that this Court award 
Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet their attorneys' fees and costs incurred in this appeal as per the 
terms of the Agreement. 
DATED this 6th day of April, 2009. 
HIRSCHI CHRISTENSEN, PLLC 
s/ Brennan H. Moss 
David P. Hirschi 
Brennan H. Moss 
Attorneys for Appellees 
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I hereby certify that pursuant to Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
on the 6th day of April, 2009 I caused two true and correct copies of APPELLEE'S 
BRIEF to be be mailed first-class, postage prepaid to the following: 
Shawn D. Turner 
LARSON TURNER DALBY & ETHINGTON, L.C. 
1218 West South Jordan Parkway, Suite B 
South Jordan, Utah 84095 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
I further certify that pursuant to Utah Supreme Court Standing Order No. 8, on the 
6h day of April, 2009 I caused a digital copy of APPELLEE'S BRIEF in searchable 
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Attorney for Plaintiff 
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